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The relationship between argument and narrative has been the subject of much 
debate, particularly in the area of law, where a number of theorists have argued 
for the priority of one over the other in the decision-making process, the 
premise being that argumentation and narrative are two distinct text forms. 
Through the rhetorical analysis of a series of expert reports in a case of alleged 
child abuse, we seek to explore the dynamics between argumentation and 
narrative. In so doing, we argue that while certain actions may undermine the 
robustness of an argument, it is these very actions that make possible the telling 
of a persuasive story. We conclude with a plea for the development of 
rhetorical skills among social workers so as to be better able to discern future 
directions for the benefit of service users. 
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Social work is infused with narrative: plot, characterization, genre, 
voice, authorship, and readership; all play a part in social work practice. 
Social workers draw on the stories of others in order to construct stories 
about the past (what happened), as the basis for constructing their own 
stories about preferred futures (what they want to happen). That is the 
structure of much assessment and care planning. Social workers 
characterize, implicitly or explicitly, the actors in those stories. Social 
workers frame situations as instances of, or related to, particular wider 
narratives. As Wilks (2005) says: “We are a story-telling lot, we social 
workers” (p. 1249). 
Riessman and Quinney (2005) found that the majority of the 
literature on narrative and social work focused on narrative as a method, 
the use of narrative in social work education, and autobiographical 
narratives of social workers, and were disappointed by the limited use of 
narrative in social work research. The use of narrative as a lens through 
which to understand the materials and processes of social work was even 
more limited at that time—and is still limited today. While there are 
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exceptions, for example, Hall (1997, 2013), Urek (2005), and Baldwin 
(2013), even these do not explore the narratives with which social 
workers work—those of service users, family members, colleagues, 
doctors, attorneys, experts, teachers, the courts, and so on—as a form of 
argument. In stating this claim, we make the important distinction 
between narrative analysis and discourse analysis (see, for example, 
Wertz et al., 2011). Discourse analysis often focuses on small units of 
language (the word, phrase, and sentence) rather than the narrative as a 
whole, seeking patterns in the use of such language. Narrative analysis 
seeks to understand the work that stories are called upon to do, how plot, 
events, and characters are configured within the story as a whole, and the 
action of stories in the world (see Frank, 2010). Discourse analysis seeks 
to locate language usage in larger configurations of power (e.g., 
Fairclough, 2010), and while narrative might draw on notions of “meta-
narrative” or “dominant narratives,” the purpose in so doing is to analyze 
the interaction between these and smaller narratives, how narratives 
compete for privilege, and how narratives draw on the available social 
and cultural storied resources as a means of persuasion (for example, see 
Wagenaar, van Koppen, & Crombag, 1993, on the notion of anchored 
narratives). While there are many good discourse analyses of narrative 
data (e.g., Hall, Sarangi, & Slembrouk 1997, 1999; Hall, Slembrouk, & 
Sarangi, 2006), narrative analysis of social work practice remains an 
underexplored area. 
By taking a narrative approach, it is possible to understand the 
multiple texts with which social workers work (interviews, case notes, 
court reports, expert reports, and so on), not as simply descriptive 
accounts of circumstances, nor as textual or verbal vessels conveying 
evidence, but as a form of deliberative rhetoric intended to persuade 
others as to a particular course of action (see Eberhard, 2012, on the 
rhetoric of health and medicine). Social workers have to evaluate such 
texts as their subsequent narrative (in the form of a care plan, for 
example) will serve to stabilize a particular story and turn it into a 
premise for further argument (see Hannken-Illjes, 2007). For example, the 
acceptance of the expert’s narrative of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy 
(MSbP) in the UK case under discussion here formed the basis of the 
local authority’s argument in their application for the removal of the child 
from the birth family. 
Texts such as expert reports may be usefully understood as 
narratives for, according to Parrett (1987), “argumentation and narrativity 
overlap in many sequences of discourse” (p. 165). Lucaites and Condit 
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(1985) similarly state that “a narrative voice pervades virtually every 
genre and medium of human discourse” (p. 90). As we will argue, texts 
such as expert reports blend argumentation (in Aristotelian terms, the 
rhetoric of logos) with narrative, itself deploying rhetorical techniques 
peculiar to it. As such, an examination of the relationship and dynamic 
between narrative and argumentation is useful. 
Below, we explore the dynamics between argumentation and 
narrative through the rhetorical analysis of a series of expert reports in a 
case of alleged child abuse. We begin by outlining the relationship 
between narrative and argumentation and introduce our stance that 
narrative and argumentation are inextricably linked. We then provide an 
overview of the expert reports we will use to make our case and pursue 
our argument in the following manner. First, we outline the process of 
abductive reasoning and the criteria by which the robustness of abductive 
arguments can be evaluated based on Thagar’s (1978) criteria of 
defeasibility, consilience, simplicity, and introduction of ad hoc theories. 
As we proceed, we discuss how in the expert reports the pediatrician 
undermines his own abductive argument by reducing these qualities. 
Following this, we turn to some general features of narrative, which are 
important to understanding how narrative and argument might differ in 
the ways that are pertinent to their rhetorical efficacy: narrative 
relationships, narrative causality, and narrative environment. We then 
conduct a narrative analysis of the reports and embark on a discussion of 
the criteria for narrative persuasiveness and how the pediatrician’s story is 
able to meet such criteria. Finally, we turn to the lessons that might be 
drawn from this case for social workers if they are to analyze and 
evaluate expert reports, rather than simply accept such reports as seems to 
be case currently (see Social Work Outlaw, 2015).  
 
Narrative and Argumentation 
 
The debate over the relationship between narrative and 
argumentation has, for the most part, focused on law and legal 
proceedings (e.g., Bennett & Feldman, 1981; Bex, 2009, 2013; Bex, 
Prakken, & Verheij, 2006; Bex et al., 2007; Pennington & Hastie, 1991, 
1992, 1994; Wagenaar et al., 1993). Much of the debate, with the 
exception of Bex (2009, 2013) and Bex and Verheij (2013), suggests that 
legal decision-making is predominantly framed either in terms of 
evidence or in terms of narrative. For example, Bennett and Feldman 
(1981) cite research to indicate that a coherent story that is untrue appears 
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more persuasive than a true story that is fragmented; similarly, Wagenaar 
et al. (1993) argue that in criminal trials, linking thin evidence through 
story may be compelling even if the argument is logically absurd (see, for 
example, their account of a case of alleged sexual abuse on pp. 3–5). 
Pennington and Hastie (1991, 1992, 1994); Bex (2013); and Bex, 
Koppen, Prakken, and Verheij (2010) take a slightly different approach, 
arguing that both stories and evidence-based reasoning are required in the 
decision-making process and that a good story need necessarily cover the 
“facts,” though there may, of course, be an argument over what the facts 
are and their relevance. For Pennington and Hastie, both coverage of the 
facts and coherence of the story are required for a story to be persuasive. 
However, in holding to the position that it is through stories that jurors 
organize the complex mass of evidence to which they are exposed, 
Pennington and Hastie seem to be implying that story is more influential 
than argument in determining what happened. Bex and colleagues have 
attempted a hybrid theory, linking argumentation and story in legal 
decision-making. Their basic stance is that stories are developed to 
explain observed facts and that competing explanatory stories can be 
evaluated according to their anchoring in evidence (Bex et al., 2006, 
2007; Bex & Verheij, 2011). 
The position we take in this article is closer to that of Pennington 
and Hastie, in that we agree that a good story may take precedence over 
argument, but we differ in our analysis of the relationship between story 
and argument. Rather than viewing argumentation and narrative as two 
distinct text forms, often with narrative playing a secondary and 
somewhat suspect role, we want to suggest that narrative and 
argumentation are inextricably linked. We maintain that argumentation is 
at least implicitly narrative in form and narrative is a form of 
argumentation. This approach to the relationship between narrative and 
argumentation aligns more closely with the stance taken by White (1987) 
and Hannken-Illjes (2011), based on Quintilian: 
 
Or again what difference is there between a proof (probation) and 
a statement of facts (narratio) save that the latter is a proof put 
forward in continuous form, while a proof is a verification of the 
facts coherent with the statement? (c. 95 CE/1920)  
 
In other words, narrative and argumentation are not two separate text 
forms but two aspects of the same form (see Olmos, 2013), though 
perhaps at times one or the other is foregrounded for rhetorical purposes. 
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The Expert Reports 
 
In making our argument we will focus on a series of reports 
prepared by a pediatrician in the UK in a case of alleged Munchausen 
Syndrome by Proxy (MSbP). MSbP is generally presented as a form of 
child abuse (or a psychiatric diagnosis of the perpetrator) in which the 
perpetrator fabricates or induces illness in another in order to seek 
medical attention. In the literature, the vast majority of cases report a 
mother as perpetrator and her child(ren) as victim(s). Since its 
formulation by Meadow (1977), it has become a highly contested 
diagnosis with its proponents claiming that it is a valid diagnostic 
category with a respectable history and which, over the years, has saved 
the lives of many children (Wilson, 2001). On the other hand, others 
argue that it is conceptually confused, empirically flawed, and 
operationally questionable (see Mart, 1999; Morley, 1995).  
The reports under consideration here formed much of the basis of 
the local authority’s case for the removal of the child under the provisions 
of the Children Act (UK, 1989), though they had, in fact, already formed 
their opinion that this was a case of MSbP prior to receiving these reports 
and had attempted to argue for estoppel—that is, to argue that this matter 
had already been determined by previous court proceedings and so the 
only matter remaining was that of disposal (i.e., what should happen to 
the child). It was only when their arguments for estoppel failed that the 
pediatrician was jointly instructed by the mother and the Guardian ad 
litem (appointed by the court to advocate for a minor) to report on the 
question of whether or not this was a case of MSbP. Following the first 
report, the Guardian ad litem unilaterally solicited three further reports for 
her own purposes. Together these reports constitute the pediatrician’s 
opinion on the case, though the later reports should be seen more as being 
produced in the service of those bringing the case against the mother than 
jointly instructed, independent reports. These reports present the 
pediatrician’s argument that this was, indeed, a case of MSbP and were 
highly influential in determining the outcome of the domestic court 
proceedings in which the judge freed the child for adoption. However, on 
appeal, the European Court of Human Rights found that the local 
authority’s investigation of the case and the subsequent court proceedings 
had violated not only the human rights of the parents but also those of the 
child whom the social services were supposedly protecting (see Baldwin, 
2008). Hence, a close analysis of these reports may aid understanding of 
how this situation may have arisen. 
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The argument of the reports is framed as the best explanation of 
the data (abduction), and has the appearance of a generic text. However, 
as Hydén (1997) writes, such texts “all contain a ‘story’ about one or 
several persons, their actions and mutual relationships, and specifically 
about the possible relationship between the person/persons and the 
authority in question” (p. 246). The issue we explore here is the 
relationship between the pediatrician’s overt argument and his implicit 
narrative. 
Although there are similarities between Pennington and Hastie’s 
concepts of “consistency” and “coverage,” and the terms “defeasibility” 
and “consilience” as used in the literature on abduction, these concepts 
serve different purposes. For Pennington and Hastie, consistency and 
coverage are features of a good story, a story which may simply override 
argument; here we will argue that a good story becomes possible because 
of the failings in an ostensibly logical argument. In other words, as the 
logical argument of the reports is undermined by the pediatrician’s own 
attempts to make his hypothesis work, it becomes possible to tell a good 
story which then serves the same purpose. This claim is contra Bex and 
colleagues, who argue that competing explanatory stories can be assessed 
by their relative alignment with supporting arguments, and contra Bennett 
and Feldman in that it does not presume there to be a true story masked 




Abductive reasoning, otherwise known as inference to the best 
explanation, is a form of inference that seeks to establish a hypothesis 
which best explains and accounts for the available data. In the theory-
forming process of analyzing data, several competing hypotheses may 
provide explanatory power of the data, so one must be able to reject all 
such alternative hypotheses before one is warranted in making the 
inference. One infers, from the premise that a given hypothesis would 
provide a “better” explanation for the evidence than would any other 
hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given hypothesis is true (Harman, 
1965).  
This process, from data to explanatory hypothesis, can be thought 
of as an interpretive or theory-forming inference. In its most basic form, 
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D is a collection of data (facts, observations, givens). 
Hypothesis H explains D. 
No other hypothesis can explain D as well as H does. 
Therefore, H is probably true. (Josephson, 2001) 
 
This type of imaginative reasoning is quite common and can be found in 
day-to-day life as well as in various fields such as law, science, and 
medicine. We can see its usage quite clearly in adversarial law, where a 
prosecutor may evaluate the data of a case to determine that the presence 
of the accused’s fingerprints at the crime scene (D) and his lack of an 
alibi (D) can be best explained by his involvement in the crime (H). This 
reasoning is also found within the medical field, where a doctor may 
determine that a combination of symptoms can be best explained by a 
particular diagnosis. The determining factor in choosing one hypothesis 
as the “best” explanation is the reasoning that no other explanation 
succeeds in accounting for the facts while remaining both plausible and 
simple enough to be readily accepted. It is clear that in the case presented 
here that the pediatrician, while not using the term abduction, was 
deploying such, explicitly stating that, “This is the unifying hypothesis in 
this case, i.e. it is the diagnosis which readily explains all the known 
facts” (p. 30). 
Given that this was so, the persuasiveness or robustness of the 
argument presented in the reports implicitly rests on the criteria for a 
sound abductive argument, as introduced by Thagar (1978). While 
practitioners of law and medicine arrive at the “best” explanatory 
hypotheses through abductive reasoning, abductive inference is generally 
defeasible (Thagar, 1978), meaning that the conclusion is subject to 
retraction if further investigation of the facts shows that another 
alternative explanation proves “better” (Walton, 2001). For example, a 
prosecutor’s hypothesis can be weakened if new data suggests that the 
accused was seen shopping at the time of the crime, and the doctor’s 
diagnosis can be similarly weakened with the presence of new and 
contradictory symptoms. 
When we examine the reports of the case we find a number of 
occasions in which the pediatrician reduces the defeasibility of his 
argument. First, in responding to the mother’s statement which 
documented the many occasions on which test results aligned with her 
description of his symptoms, the pediatrician accepts that there might be 
occasions on which the test results indicated that the child might be 
unwell, but that it is the pattern of presentations that is important and that 
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the pattern is not dependent upon any single instance. He does not, 
however, take the next step of stating how many such instances would 
undermine the pattern, but rules out virtually every occasion on which test 
results were abnormal by saying that they were either false positives or 
that abnormal test results do not necessarily indicate that the child was 
unwell. In other words, contradictory evidence is dismissed as not being 
relevant to the diagnosis. In doing so, he undermines the defeasibility of 
his argument in that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to argue 
against his position, because evidence supporting that counter argument is 
ruled inadmissible.  
Second, consilience adds to an argument by unifying and 
systematizing the data available, so that the hypothesis becomes stronger 
as it explains or accounts for more of the data than a competing 
hypothesis (Thagar, 1978). The consilience of an argument becomes 
greater if, when new data is made available, it can absorb these data and 
further unify it within its claim (Thagar, 1978). Consilience is the ability 
of a hypothesis to explain the range of data, and this, indeed, is the claim 
of the pediatrician. However, the pediatrician’s hypothesis (MSbP), in 
and of itself, cannot absorb data that indicates abnormality (e.g., test 
results) or incidents of genuine—and uncontested—illness. One way of 
dealing with these incidents is to remove them from needing to be 
considered by the core hypothesis, but by doing so, the consilience of the 
argument is significantly reduced. 
Third, the robustness of an initial hypothesis is increased if no 
further ad hoc theories are required to explain the data than the narrow 
range it was introduced to explain (Thagar, 1978). This process of 
including narrow theory within an argument may strengthen consilience 
while reducing its level of simplicity. From the above comments around 
consilience, we see that the MSbP hypothesis is unable to explain “all the 
known facts” and so significant data are excluded from consideration. In 
order to justify such exclusion, the pediatrician is forced to introduce 
secondary hypotheses. The first of these is the hypothesis that it is 
customary for mothers in such cases to seek “to break down the alleged 
abuse into its component parts and attempt to ‘shoot down’ the evidence 
piece by piece” (p. 21); the second is the hypothesis that it is normal to 
find abnormalities in the test results of children and thus abnormal test 
results do not necessarily indicate that the child is unwell. These two 
hypotheses are introduced into the report without any supporting 
evidence, but are required in order to explain a wide range of data—
documented abnormalities, abnormal test results, episodes of genuine 
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illness, problems with testing procedures, other occasions where tests 
failed to find laxatives, and so on (p. 21)—and thus to defend the core 
hypothesis of MSbP.  
Fourth, simplicity in argumentation is achieved by requiring less 
information in order to establish a suitable hypothesis (Thagar, 1978). By 
requiring fewer initial conditions and postulates in order to explain data, 
simplicity often conflicts with a consilience approach and this is what we 
find here: a consilience argument does not have to be simple, in that it 
might, for example, expand to suggest multiple causalities for the 
presence of a variety of symptoms. A simpler hypothesis may forego 
pursuing multiple postulates in favor of a single causality, but then risks 
not being able to explain a wide range of data. Thus, in our case example, 
the pediatrician strongly rejects multiple causation, a conclusion achieved 
by requiring less information in order to establish a suitable hypothesis. 
While at first sight the MSbP hypothesis appears simpler, it requires a 
number of conditions and postulates to explain data—in the form of 
unsupported ad hoc hypotheses and an insistence on a pattern in the data 
that is not dependent upon the individual pieces of data. A simpler 
hypothesis—multiple causation—would have extended the range of data 





Before commencing our analysis of the narrative aspects of the 
reports, there are three general points that need to be raised in order to 
understand how narrative and argument might differ in the ways that are 
pertinent to their rhetorical efficacy: narrative relationships, narrative 




Abduction is a form of reasoning that is, in some ways, abstracted 
from the context within which it is deployed. The abductive process 
moves from data through hypothesis to best inference without being 
required to accommodate the particular intentions, desires, or even foibles 
of the person making the argument. As such it is, or at least gives, the 
appearance of, an agentless argument—the argument stands or falls on 
the criteria for robustness, without regard for whether the author is 
virtuous or malevolent, the reader disinterested or partisan. In narrative, 
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on the other hand, authors and readers co-construct the text, and the 
persuasiveness of a given narrative depends upon this relationship. Thus, 
a narrative becomes more persuasive through the ethos of the author and 
appeal to the pathos of the reader. In the case under discussion here, for 
example, the expertise of the pediatrician stated in the preamble to the 
main report (comprising his experience, qualifications, positions, etc.) 
serves to establish the author’s credibility and trustworthiness (ethos) to 
tell this category of story; and his characterization of the mother helps 
align his opinion with that of the social services (pathos). (For a full 
discussion of this dynamic, see Baldwin, 2011). The move toward 
narrative thus allows an argument to draw on these rhetorical strategies in 
addition to those accessible by argument itself (logos) and the melding of 





Abduction follows the general structure outlined above: data, 
hypothesis, and best inference. Data are linked to the best inference 
through the hypothesis that stands against other hypotheses and a 
judgment made as to the best inference on the basis of a set of criteria. 
Narrative does not work in this way. All narratives are unique 
configurations of events, desire, characterization, genre, and authorial 
intent within a plot. Further, these configurations are contingent—they 
could be otherwise—and while, in non-fictive stories, there has to be 
some degree of narrative-to-world fit, there is also a degree of world-
making within the process of narration (see Herman, 2009). In particular, 
the world-making function of narrative can be seen in the ways authors 
present (or imply) causation. Thus, prior events may be presented (or 
implied) as being causative of current situations—see the discussion of 
narrative structure below—and can be taken to be so if such causation 
makes sense within the established plot, characterization, and genre. 




Abductive arguments stand or fall alone. The rationality of any 
given argument is internal to that argument and does not depend on 
whether other abductive arguments about similar issues have failed or 
succeeded. For instance, the argument that case X is a case of MSbP is 
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not dependent upon case Y being a case of MSbP, and, indeed, case Y, 
unless linked in some other way to case X, is irrelevant to the argument 
regarding case X. Again, narratives do not work in this way. In their 
telling, narratives enter into a narrative environment that may support or 
undermine their acceptance or plausibility (see Randall & McKim, 2008). 
If the narrative environment into which they enter holds stories that are 
similar to the new story, then the new story is more likely to be evaluated 
favourably than if the new story is contrary to the accepted stock of 
stories. For example, in this case the social worker leading the case 
reported that the mother had made a false report of a house fire. False 
reporting of house fires is, according to Artingstall (1998), a feature of 
cases of MSbP. This presumably explains the pediatrician’s acceptance 
and repetition of the story without checking the veracity of the report. 
Had he done so he would have found that the social worker’s report was 
itself a fabrication (see Baldwin, 2005). 
In addition to resemblance to other stories, narratives that 
resemble an archetypical story are viewed as more persuasive than those 
that deviate from that archetype, what Bruner (1990) terms canonicality. 
According to Bruner, this canonicality acts as a sort of measuring stick 
for stories, gauging how a certain story performs when compared to what 
is generally understood to be the template for a canonical narrative in a 
particular area. The greater the conformity of any given story to the 
canonical template, the greater the endowment of legitimacy and 
authority to that story. Anything deviating or being exceptional to this 
idea of canonicality may be judged or evaluated as of legitimacy and 
authority to that story. A good story should be well-structured 
(understandable) and plausible, with a “plausible” story correctly 
describing a general pattern of states and events one expects to come 
across in the world. Anything deviating from expectations and 
recognizable patterns is deemed “bad” and subject to negative evaluation. 
Thus, the interpretation of abnormal test results as clinically insignificant 
moves the story towards canonicality while an interpretation of these as 
indicating genuine illness would move the story away from canonicality. 
Similarly, the characterization of the mother as an archetypal MSbP 
perpetrator—there is nothing in the reports to suggest that she is anything 
but—enhances canonicality. Indeed, actions that would normally be 
viewed as appropriate—for example, the mother’s challenging of the 
pediatrician’s interpretation of the medical data—was interpreted through 
the lens of MSbP as seeking to shoot down the evidence piece by piece, a 
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ploy usual in such cases (and thus itself suspicious), rather than being part 
of due process (see Baldwin, 2011). 
 
Criteria for Narrative Persuasiveness. Like the case for 
abduction, narratives are more or less persuasive, dependent upon a 
number of interlocking criteria: clarity of central action, level of detail, 
coherence and consistency, and structure. These criteria, however, are not 
reliant on consilience, defeasibility, or the exclusion of ad hoc 
theorization as criteria of persuasiveness. 
 
Clarity of Central Action. Bennett and Feldman (1981), in their 
work examining the role of narrative in judicial proceedings, argue that a 
narrative with a clear central action is generally more persuasive than one 
in which the central action is blurred, ambiguous, or confused (see also 
Wagenaar et al., 1993). Clarity in central action enables readers to 
construct inferences about how events, characters, and motivations relate 
to the central action, and allows readers to decide whether the inferences 
are compatible with each other and how such inferences may support the 
plot trajectory toward unequivocal interpretation of events (p. 41). 
Without clarity of central action, the polysemic potential of the story (the 
potential for being read in numerous ways) may result in the reader 
making inferences that do not point to the preferred interpretation. In 
simple situations it may be relatively easy to identify the central action; in 
complex situations it may be more difficult. 
One way to clarify the central action of a complex story is to 
simplify the situation to focus on a single cause rather than multiple 
causes. This focuses attention and avoids the potential threat to telling a 
cohesive and consistent story that the interaction of multiple causes might 
pose. For example, it may be easier to tell, and hear, a story of suicide 
focusing on one precipitating factor rather than many. In the reports 
analyzed here, the pediatrician is at pains to avoid multiple causation: 
“For any one incident in isolation it would usually be easy to hypothesise 
a genuine medical reason, but in this case any hypothesis must explain the 
overall pattern of events” (p. 23). In other words, singular causation is to 
be preferred over multiple causation resulting in clarity of central action, 
namely MSbP abuse. The danger inherent in this process of reductionism 
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Level of Detail. A narrative is made more or less persuasive (or 
believable) according to not only what is included but also according to 
what is excluded from the final narrative—that is, the level of detail that 
is provided (see Bartlett & Wilson, 1982). On the one hand, including 
detail may make a situation appear more dramatic—for example, on p.11 
of the main report, the pediatrician lists 21 items that the child’s mother 
reported as her son being allergic to, this being in the context of the report 
opining that the child’s medical history was a function of the mother’s 
MSbP behaviour. However, when one examines the list more closely, one 
finds that five of these are closely linked to dairy products (which is itself 
listed as a sixth allergy in this family), five linked to citrus fruits (again 
with the category “citrus fruits” being listed as a further allergy), and four 
potentially linked to food and drink additives. The other five are all fruit. 
Had the pediatrician listed but five families of allergies the impact of the 
list might possibly have been lessened.  
On the other hand, removing a certain level of detail, especially if 
that detail presents an internally contradictory or too complex a picture, 
helps clarify the central action—there is less “noise” to distract the reader. 
For example, there is no mention of the highly contested nature of the 
MSbP hypothesis or its rejection as having evidentiary probity in a 
number of jurisdictions (see Baldwin, 2011, for a summary of these 
aspects of MSbP)—facts which, if included, might undermine the 
credibility of his argument. Hence the level of detail, and thus the 
persuasive impact of any story, needs to be carefully considered lest too 
much detail disrupts the intention of the story, or the removal of too much 
detail results in the story becomes sketchy, vague, or ambiguous. 
 
Cohesiveness and Consistency. It has been demonstrated by 
Bennett and Feldman (1981) that as “structural ambiguities in stories 
increase, credibility decreases, and vice versa” (p. 85). In Bennett and 
Feldman’s work, structural ambiguities refer to the clarity (or lack 
thereof) in the central action which gains its meaning from its setting and 
its resolution, the understandability of the connections made within the 
story, and the consistency of these connections with the central action and 
one another. The consistency of these connections provides interpretative 
clues that support one interpretation and exclude all others (p. 81). Thus, 
in Bennett and Feldman’s research, they found that a cohesive and 
consistent narrative was thought generally by participants to be true when 
it was not, and a fragmented, inconsistent, or ambiguous narrative was 
thought false when, in fact, it was true. For Bennett and Feldman, the 
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structural aspects of the story become “crucial to judgment in cases in 
which a collection of facts or evidence is subject to competing 
interpretations” (p. 85). There are, of course, limitations to this, in that a 
story must bear enough relationship to the evidence to be considered 
structurally adequate, but even so there is always freedom within those 
limits for the adequacy of competing stories to be considered.  
On first reading, the pediatrician’s story appears both cohesive 
and consistent, with little, if anything, internal to the reports that would 
disrupt the narrative flow. This cohesiveness and consistency, however, is 
achieved through two processes of “narrative smoothing,” processes 
which bring “the clinical assessment into conformity with some kind of 
public standard or stereotype” (Spence, 1986, p. 212). The first is the 
presentation of the case within a cohesive frame, failing to acknowledge 
the contested and controversial nature of MSbP diagnosis, and the citation 
of supporting sources only. The second is the emphasis on the mother as 
embodying many of the characteristics of the MSbP perpetrator without 
reference to those characteristics and behaviours that stand contrary to 
such an interpretation. 
Similarly, whereas in abductive reasoning the introduction of ad 
hoc hypotheses is reason to question the robustness of the core 
hypothesis, in a story such additional explanations appear as part of a 
developing plot and thus do not jeopardize coherence or consistency 
provided they move the plot forward. So, for example, the introduction of 
the ad hoc hypothesis that “abnormal test results do not mean that the 
child is unwell” helps keep the trajectory of the story, established by the 
emplotment of events as a case of MSbP, on track, rather than 
undermining the plot. 
 
Structure. Unlike abductive arguments that must take a particular 
form, authors can deploy a number of narrative techniques in order to 
enhance the persuasiveness of their narratives. One such technique is the 
choice of how to structure one’s story. Narratives, as was argued earlier, 
have particular narrative trajectories that are given a certain forward 
momentum by the structuring of events in specific ways. The purpose of 
the structure is to lead the reader along the narrative trajectory toward the 
desired conclusion and thus reduce the possibility of polysemy. This is 
similar to Pennington and Hastie’s (1986) observation that the ordering of 
evidence significantly influences the judgment. An analysis of the 
structure of the main report illustrates this phenomenon. After the 
introductory remarks establishing the ethos of the author (see below), 
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there are four sections dealing with the medical records. The first 
addresses the medical history of the mother’s first child (approximately 1 
page); the second presents the medical history of the second child 
(approximately 13 pages); the third presents the medical history of the 
mother (approximately 8 pages) and the maternity records regarding the 
mother and the unborn, index-child-to-be (approximately 2 pages). There 
follows a section titled “Analysis” and then a conclusion in which the 
pediatrician makes his recommendations. 
Such a structure is quite normal and, one might say, logical. It is, 
however, also rhetorical in that it presents material in a way that mirrors 
the argument that the mother had a pattern of behaviour: structure and 
content come together. Further, the structure lends the argument 
momentum—child one, child two, the mother, and child three—
establishing an implicit narrative causality through analysis to the 
(inevitable) conclusion and recommendations. In narrative terms, the 
pediatrician does not only tell his readers that there is a pattern of 
behaviour but shows his readers through his choice of narrative structure. 
Similarly, the structure of each section can be viewed as 
rhetorically structured in that incidents that the pediatrician claimed were 
medically unexplained (part of the basis for his argument that the 
incidents were a result of the mother’s behaviour) are interspersed with 
other incidents that are not remarked upon but gain their significance 
from their positioning within the lists of other (supposedly) unexplained 
symptoms. Thus the reader is invited to interpret the latter, unremarked- 
on incidents as potentially suspect (for this inferential approach to 
establishing connections between incidents, see Bennett & Feldman, 
1981, pp. 125ff). No evidence whatsoever is presented in the report that 
such incidents were in fact fabricated and no claim was made that they 
were—the result being that the inference made by the positioning of these 
incidents is that there is a stronger pattern than if we removed these 
incidents. While this would serve to undermine an abductive argument—
the hypothesis not clearly being able to explain the data—within a 
narrative, such inferences are invitations for readers to fill the gaps, a 
rhetorical technique designed to enhance the persuasiveness of the story. 
This technique is, however, dependent upon the reader filling the gaps in 
line with the author’s intent, and while this cannot be guaranteed (witness 
our counter-story here, for example), the structure of the narrative 









To this point, we have argued that the expert reports in this case 
form a rhetorical blend of argument and narrative, illustrating the 
relationship between narrative and argumentation in an alleged case of 
MSbP. While the pediatrician clearly states that his theory is the best 
available to explain the data as a whole, this position is undermined at 
various points as he introduces ad hoc theories in order to justify the 
reduction in consilience through dismissing consideration of a wide range 
of data, and thus reduces the defeasibility of his argument. However, in 
doing so, he is able to clarify the central action, provide enough detail to 
deliver a credible story, enhance the cohesiveness and consistency of that 
story, and structure his story so as to lead the reader to the preferred 
conclusion. Argument and narrative work alongside each other. Logos, 
ethos, and pathos thus intertwine. 
If this is so, then social workers need to develop the rhetorical 
skills with which to evaluate such texts. In terms of logic, social workers 
need to understand the type of arguments being put forward and the 
criteria by which to evaluate such arguments (logos). In terms of ethos, 
we need to be able to reflect upon how the credibility and trustworthiness 
of the expert is achieved and the impact that ethos has on us, as readers. 
To what extent are we swayed by the credentials, position, experience, 
and expertise of the “expert”? How do we respond to invitations to fill the 
gaps? Certainly, we should pay attention to what experts say, but at the 
same time, we need to remember that “even when the experts all agree, 
they may well be mistaken” (Russell, 2004). Being able to discern the 
means by which experts construct their (persuasive) reports requires a 
knowledge and understanding of rhetoric. 
Similarly, we need to be reflexive about the impact that pathos has 
on us. Just as authors are not innocent narrators, we are not innocent 
readers: authors and readers each have their desires, intentions, interests, 
and predispositions. The failure of the social workers in this case to 
evaluate critically these reports contributed to the violation of the human 
rights of both the parents and the child whom they were supposedly 
charged with protecting (see Baldwin, 2011). It also speaks to the ease 
with which we can be seduced by a significantly flawed argument when 
framed as a narrative that aligns with our preferred outcome (see 
Baldwin, 2011). Hence, we need to be aware of how we are influenced by 
ethos and pathos if we are to act in the best interests of service users. 
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Just as authors are not innocent (Social Work Outcast, 2015), the 
social worker who works day in and day out with families and children is 
the real expert in such cases, and to abandon that expertise is to abandon 
our integrity. Skill in rhetorical analysis may help move social work out 
of the shadow of expert reporting and re-establish social workers as 
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